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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [redacted]

INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY Spain

DATE DISTR. 14 DEC 50

SUBJECT Effects of the Departure from France of Indalecio PRIETO

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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SOURCE [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

1. The departure of Indalecio PRIETO Tuero for Cuba was interpreted in Spanish Socialist circles in France as desertion of the anti-FRANCO cause, according to the Cenetista Jose E. LEIVA.* The PRIETO failure, the French police action against Spanish Communists, and the UN vote in favor of FRANCO, all have contributed to the growth in the Socialist rank and file of a tendency towards rapprochement with the Communists, LEIVA stated in early November 1950. PRIETO's departure, according to LEIVA, also has brought out into the open enmities within the Socialist Executive Committee which hitherto had been concealed for the sake of unity. (b)(1) (b)(3)

2. The Socialist Executive Committee inside Spain, through a letter addressed to Secretary General Rodolfo LLOPIS Ferrandiz, has severely criticized the exiles for concessions allegedly made to the Monarchists. The interior group, LEIVA stated, while indicating willingness to make compromises for a rapid solution of the Spanish problem, felt that the exiles had gone too far in the direction of surrender to the Monarchy.

3. Gregorio GONZALEZ, former collaborator with Antonio TRIGO Mairal on the interior Socialist Executive Committee, in mid-August criticized the exile party for obstruction of Socialist collaboration in the Comite Interior de Coordinacion. The CIC, GONZALEZ said, was the logical consequence of the Right Point Pact in the view of the Socialists inside Spain, who felt that the principal problem was the overthrow of FRANCO. The interior Socialists, through the CIC, were not negotiating blindly with the Monarchists, GONZALEZ insisted, but were assured of the Ministries of War and Interior and control of other key organisms to prevent "Franquism without FRANCO." The concern of the Socialists outside Spain, GONZALEZ said, was first with the personal triumph of PRIETO and next with jockeying for position to inherit PRIETO's power; without the cohesive influence of PRIETO's personality, the party would be split by dissension and by a struggle for supremacy among Trifon GOMEZ San Jose, LLOPIS and Wenceslao CARRILLO Alonso. The exiled leaders all were agreed, however, according to GONZALEZ, on the subordination of the party inside Spain. (b)(1) (b)(3)

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4. GONZALEZ, who in August 1949 was forced to flee Spain to avoid arrest, said that he had received financial aid from Jose CALVIÑO Ozores, the administrator of various properties removed from Spain by the republicans during the Civil War.** CALVIÑO Ozores, himself a Socialist, reportedly gives funds to exiled Socialists on the recommendation of LLOPIS.

[redacted] A Reuters dispatch from Havana published in the New York Times of 26 November 1950 reported that PRIETO had announced his resignation as President of the PSOE and Vice-President of the UGT, as a result of the UN action on Spain. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted] reported some of the financial activities of CALVIÑO Ozores. (b)(1) (b)(3)

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